Research has shown the importance of corporate disclosure and dissemination in reducing information asymmetry and improving market efficiency. However, even though investors and analysts might receive corporate disclosures, they often need help with assimilating the information to better understand its implications for firm value. This paper examines whether investor relations (IR) teams provide value by facilitating the assimilation of firm information by the market. We find that firms with IR officers have lower stock price volatility, lower analyst forecast dispersion, higher analyst forecast accuracy, and quicker price discovery, consistent with IR professionals aiding market participants in their assimilation of firm information. We also show that our findings are stronger for firms with longer-tenured IR officers. Finally, we find that when firms transition from a long-tenured IR officer to a new IR officer, stock price volatility increases, analyst forecasts become more disperse and less accurate, and the price discovery process slows. Collectively, these findings suggest that in-house IR teams, particularly those with greater experience, help facilitate information assimilation by the market, which has positive market effects.
Introduction
This paper examines whether in-house investor relations (IR) teams provide value to firms by facilitating the assimilation of firm information by the market. 1 Prior research has shown the importance of disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Shroff, Sun, White and Zhang 2013) and dissemination (Bushee, Core, Guay and Hamm 2010; Blankespoor, Miller and White 2013; Twedt 2016 ) in reducing information asymmetry and improving the price discovery process by providing firm information to market participants. However, even though investors and analysts might receive corporate disclosures (or other news) about the firm, they often need help assimilating the information to better understand its implications for firm value. We contend that IR professionals play a crucial role in helping the market better understand the firm by engaging in regular, ongoing interactions with investors and analysts to resolve uncertainties they might have about the firm, thereby improving market efficiency. 2 Our results are consistent with IR professionals playing such a role.
Information assimilation has become a more salient issue for firms in recent years. In particular, there has been a large increase in the frequency and length of firm disclosures, which can overload investors' processing abilities (Simon 1978; Merton 1987; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . 1 We define assimilation as the process of developing a comprehensive and contextual understanding of information. In our setting, this understanding relates to the firm and its prospects, and thus firm value. Note that assimilation is related to, but distinct from, the concept of readability. For example, a firm might disclose plans to increase capital expenditures by 10% in the following year. Investors that receive this disclosure likely understand it from a readability perspective, i.e., they understand the words and concepts; however, they might not fully appreciate the implications of the disclosure for firm value-i.e., they need help assimilating the information. 2 The National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) defines investor relations as the integration of "finance, communication, marketing and securities law compliance to enable the most effective two-way communication between a company, the financial community, and other constituencies, which ultimately contributes to a company's securities achieving fair valuation" (NIRI 2016) . We argue that this two-way communication is precisely the mechanism through which IR professionals provide a more robust and tailored discussion with firm stakeholders by tying together pieces of information, summarizing information, correcting misinformation, and clarifying details.
Additionally, shareholder activism and firm-related discussions in online forums, newsrooms and social media have become much more prevalent, as investors and pundits challenge management's assertions and strategies. These oft-times unvetted communications and opinions about firms can travel quickly across a broad set of market participants, which can have a significant impact on public perceptions, and thus valuation, of the firm (Lee, Hutton and Shu 2015) . As a result, a growing number of firms are retaining IR officers to communicate with market participants on a regular basis to help them assimilate information about the firm. 3 We contend that although firm disclosures can be very useful in reducing uncertainty about the firm, even the most carefully crafted firm disclosures can be insufficient, as it is very difficult for firms to fully anticipate and effectively address all market participant demands for information via disclosure. As a result, IR officers spend a lot of time with investors and analysts, tying together pieces of information, providing clarifications, correcting misunderstandings, summarizing information, etc., which helps reduce uncertainty about the firm and its prospects.
The importance of these interactions to investors and analysts is demonstrated by survey evidence in Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2015) , which indicates that private communications with the firm are valued by analysts even more than public firm disclosures, such as earnings guidance, conference calls and financial reports. Note that despite the significant value of these private discussions, they do not run afoul of financial reporting regulations, even after the 3 As shown in our Table 1 , Panel D, the number of micro-cap (mid-cap) firms with IR programs increased from 22% (44%) in 2003 to 45% (59%) in 2013, and roughly 80% of the largest firms currently have an IR officer. adoption of Regulation FD, as the SEC recognizes investors' diverse information demands and the market's need for help with assimilation (SEC 2000) . 4 It is also important to note that these discussions between IR professionals and market participants are nontrivial in both duration and frequency. In fact, IR officers dedicate more of their time to direct communications with investors and analysts than to any other single task.
According to a 2004 National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) study, IR departments spend 83% of their time, on average, interacting with analysts and institutional investors. These ongoing interactions address information demands from analysts and investors as well as mitigate any misinformation they may have, thereby helping them better understand the firm and its prospects on a timely basis; that is, IR officers can reduce the market's uncertainty about the firm. Accordingly, we predict that firms with IR officers will have lower stock price volatility and that analysts covering those firms will have less disperse forecasts with improved forecast accuracy.
To examine the impact of IR on information assimilation, we conduct our analyses using an entropy balancing technique, which is a quasi-matching approach that weights each observation such that post-weighting distributional properties of treatment and control observations are virtually identical, thereby ensuring covariate balance (Hainmueller, 2012; McMullin and Schonberger, 2015) . 5 Given the decision to initiate an IR program is a firm choice, it is important to control for factors that drive firms' decision to hire IR officers. As such, we match on firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, scaled earnings and earnings volatility, as these factors have been 4 The SEC has expressed its desire to preserve mechanisms whereby investors and analysts can build their own unique "mosaic" of understanding through discussions with the firm. In particular, the SEC states "an issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of information to an analyst, even if…that piece helps the analyst complete a "mosaic" of information that, taken together, is material." (SEC 2000) . See Section 2 for more detail. 5 See Section 4 for a detailed discussion of entropy balancing and its advantages over propensity score matching.
shown to be related to the decision to hire an IR team (Kirk and Vincent 2014; Bushee and Miller 2012) . We also control for the amount of firm disclosure, since firms with IR tend to provide more press releases (Kirk and Vincent 2014; Bushee and Miller 2012) . In addition to controlling for other firm-specific characteristics, we also test our predictions using firm fixed effect regressions.
Using this approach for a sample of firms from 2002 to 2013, we find that firms with in-house IR officers have lower stock price volatility, lower analyst forecast dispersion and higher analyst forecast accuracy, consistent with IR professionals aiding market participants in their assimilation of firm information. We also examine whether IR officers are more effective at reducing uncertainty when they have longer tenure, as they will both be more familiar with the operations of the firm and have established closer relationships with investors and analysts, allowing for more effective communications between parties. Consistent with our expectations, we show that our findings are stronger for firms with longer-tenured IR officers.
In economic terms, our results suggest that firms with IR officers (with tenures of at least one year) have 2.3% lower volatility, a 2.8% quicker price discovery process, and analyst forecasts for these firms are 7.8% more accurate and 6.3% less dipserse than those for firms without IR officers.
When restricting our sample to firms with IR officers that have more experience (at least three years), we observe even greater benefits. In particular, these firms show 3.8% lower volatility, a 3.1% quicker price discovery process, and analysts' forecasts for firms with experienced IR are 10.4% more accurate and 12.5% less disperse than those for firms without an IR officer.
To mitigate potential concerns that an omitted variable is influencing our results, we also perform the impact threshold of the confounding variable analysis recommended by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) . While this analysis cannot rule out the possibility that an omitted variable influences our results, it does suggest that such a variable would need to have a significantly larger effect than any of our current control variables to overturn our main inferences. In particular, a correlated omitted variable would need to be at least 1.5, 2.9, 3.3 or 22.2 times larger than the most impactful control variable in our tests of volatility, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion and price formation, respectively.
We then turn our analysis to three event-specific settings involving IR: (i) earnings announcements, (ii) major accounting restatements by other firms in the same industry, and (iii) the loss of a long-tenured IR officer. Each of these settings allows us to examine the role of IR professionals in the assimilation process. In the first setting, we examine earnings announcements because these are highly salient information events, where analysts have a particularly strong interest in talking with management in an attempt to get clarification regarding earnings news (Soltes 2014) . We find that firms with IR officers experience a quicker price discovery process, consistent with more efficient assimilation of earnings news by the market.
In our second setting, we use an exogenous shock to uncertainty to examine the impact of IR on information assimilation. In particular, we examine peer firm accounting restatements following Gleason et al. (2008) , who show that when a firm has a restatement, there is not only a significant price drop for that firm, but also for peer firms within the same industry due to increased uncertainty about the content and credibility of non-restating firms' disclosures. We find that although both IR and non-IR firms suffer price declines when a peer firm has a significant restatement, the stock price decline for IR firms is less severe and rebounds much more quickly, consistent with IR officers more efficiently addressing uncertainties held by the market.
In our final setting, we examine a firm's loss of a long-tenured IR officer. Unlike the previous two settings, in this setting, we expect the information environment to deteriorate. In particular, long-tenured IR officers have established relationships with investors and analysts that allow for more effective communications, so their loss should negatively impact the assimilation process.
Consistent with our expectations, we find that stock price volatility increases, analyst forecasts become more disperse and less accurate, and the price discovery process slows when firms lose a long-tenured IR officer. These results help rule out competing explanations related to contemporaneous changes in traditional disclosure, as firms are unlikely to discontinue effective disclosures when a long-tenured IR officer leaves the firm.
It is important to note that despite all our empirical analyses, we recognize that the behavior of IR officers is largely unobservable, and thus difficult to capture. Our inferences rely heavily on the fact that IR officers' primary role, which takes the vast majority of their time, is to engage investors and analysts in two-way dialogue to help them better understand the firm and its prospects (NIRI 2016). However, another role of IR is to oversee the public disclosure of the firm.
Although public firms already release a significant amount of public information, prior research has shown that IR engagement leads to even greater disclosure (Kirk and Vincent 2014; Bushee and Miller 2012) . Despite controlling for the amount of disclosure in our analyses, it's reasonable to assume that as experienced IR officers learn to better communicate with the market, they improve the firm's disclosures. The resulting improvements in disclosure may be nuanced and therefore not picked up by our disclosure control variables. Thus, the impact of IR that we find in the paper might not solely be the direct result of IR officers' interactions with market participants, but rather a combination of their interactions and changes in disclosures resulting from those private interactions. In the end, irrespective of the mechanism, our results provide key insights into the role of IR in facilitating information assimilation.
Our findings contribute along two major dimensions. First, we contribute to the large literature that focuses on the role of disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Shroff et al. 2013 ) and dissemination (Bushee et al. 2010; Blankespoor et al. 2013; Twedt 2016) in reducing information asymmetry and improving market efficiency. 6 Collectively, this literature focuses on management's ability to get information to relevant market participants via corporate disclosures.
We build on this literature by providing evidence that firms can improve market efficiency and reduce uncertainty by hiring an IR officer to help the market properly assimilate the information it receives.
Second, despite the growing popularity of IR programs, surprisingly little research has been conducted on the value of IR. This nascent literature has generally focused on the role of IR in attracting visibility for the firm (i.e., greater analyst coverage, news media attention and institutional ownership), which leads to increased liquidity, and thus higher firm valuations (Bushee and Miller, 2012; Kirk and Vincent, 2014) . However, it has been unclear whether the IR function adds value along other dimensions. We contribute to this literature by showing that the IR function can provide additional value to firms by reducing investors' uncertainty about the firm through enhanced information assimilation.
The next section discusses the motivation. Section 3 discusses the sample; Section 4 discusses the research design and empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.
6 See Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010) for a review of the disclosure literature.
Motivation

Assimilation in the capital market
A well-functioning economy relies on capital markets for efficient capital allocation (Rajan and Zingales 1998) . However, information asymmetry between managers and investors exists in these markets, as there is a separation between ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . This information asymmetry induces market frictions by introducing concerns of adverse selection, resulting in less efficient markets (Akerlof 1970) . To combat these frictions, capital markets must have a rich information environment that provides market participants with the information necessary to determine firm valuation. Consistent with this notion, prior research has shown the importance of corporate disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Beyer et al. 2010; Shroff et al. 2013) and broad dissemination of firm news (Bushee et al. 2010; Blankespoor et al. 2013; Twedt 2016) in reducing information asymmetry and improving market efficiency.
It is important to note, however, that even when investors and analysts receive corporate disclosures or other news about the firm, they often need help understanding the implications of the information for firm value. That is, they need help assimilating the information. For example, an investor might learn through a firm's disclosure that a particular firm plans to increase its capital expenditures, adjust its product mix, invest more in R&D, or increase its presence in a new region in the coming years. Similarly, an investor might learn about changes in the firm's economic environment, e.g., product market innovations, industry shifts in risk, financing availability, or competitor actions. With each of these items, there will likely be some uncertainty as to the exact nature of the event or action and ultimately its implications for the firm. Thus, once investors and analysts receive information, they need help assimilating that information to understand it in a broader, more comprehensive context with respect to firm value.
Although there has always been a need for information assimilation support, it has become a more important issue for firms in recent years. In particular, there has been a significant increase in the frequency and length of firm disclosures as a result of major disclosure regulation, most notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Given that investors have limited resources and processing abilities, large volumes of information can 'overload' investors, which reduces their ability to fully process the information (Simon 1978; Merton 1987; Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Blankespoor, Miller and White. 2014) . This can result in differential interpretations of information across investors, thereby increasing the need and demand for help with assimilation. In addition to the deluge of corporate disclosure, there have been large increases in shareholder activism and firm-related discussions from external parties in online forums, newsrooms and social media, as investors and pundits challenge management's assertions and strategies. These oft-times unvetted communications and opinions about firms can travel quickly across a broad set of market participants, which can have a significant impact on public perceptions, and thus valuation, of the firm (Lee, Hutton and Shu 2015) .
Role of investor relations in assimilation
To address these information challenges, firms are interacting more consistently with the market. As a result, managers must decide how they want to interact with investors. Many firms simply rely on top management (e.g., CFO) to conduct IR activities. The downside of this approach is that IR activities are time-consuming and require specialized expertise. As an alternative, some firms hire external IR consultants to perform IR activities. The advantage of IR consultants is that they are typically much less costly than hiring a dedicated IR professional and are therefore a better fit for firms that are financially constrained or for those with lower demand for IR services. However, one possible limitation of hiring an external IR firm is that they are often shared across multiple firms. While a shared IR firm may have a strong overall expertise in IR, they are less likely to have as detailed an understanding about the firm or have established relationships with the firm's investors and analysts relative to an internal IR officer, so they are much less helpful in facilitating information assimilation. 7 Internal IR officers are typically senior-level managers who are authorized spokespersons for the firm and are also the primary point of contact for investors (Thomson, 2009) . IR officers most often report directly to the CFO of the firm and frequently provide capital-market intelligence to the CEO and Board of Directors (Mellon, 2013) . We contend that these IR professionals not only provide considerable help as experts in disclosure compliance, but they can play a critical role in helping the market better understand the firm by engaging in regular, ongoing dialogue with investors and analysts to resolve uncertainties they might have about the firm, thereby improving market efficiency. 8 IR officers can help investors assimilate information through several means. First, they can point investors to additional information that should be considered in parallel to contextualize the disclosure. This additional information might be public already, but investors either did not have these facts readily accessible or simply didn't appreciate the relations. Second, IR officers can summarize a large amount of information, as market participants are often time-constrained, particularly when they follow many firms. Third, they can address any incorrect information held by investors. Finally, IR officers can clarify details to investors regarding their disclosures. As one analyst describes in Brown et al. (2015) , "It's not nonpublic material information; it's clarification of points. They help you digest the information a little bit better." This can also include making sense of the firm's economic environment. As indicated by another analyst in Brown et al. (2015) , "We ask for qualitative thoughts and insights into industry trends or specific business lines, just so that we're also double-checking our own thought processes and that our models are solid."
Collectively, these communications provide a more complete vision of the firm.
Importance of IR experience in facilitating assimilation
With more job experience, IR officers are likely to grow more effective at information assimilation through repeated interactions with investors and analysts. Findings from social psychology and organizational behavior describe how repeated interactions generate interpersonal familiarity, which makes communications more efficient and effective. Steiner (1972) suggests that interpersonal familiarity allows individuals to have more productive interactions because: (i) they can spend more time and effort on the task at hand, rather than acquiring the interpersonal information that is a necessary precondition for productive coordinated effort, and (ii) there is a lowered risk of mistrust, role ambiguity and miscommunication. Further, Jehn and Shah (1997) show that familiarity makes behavior between individuals more predictable and future interactions less uncertain, and therefore less costly.
Inter-personal familiarity also allows individuals to distinguish interpersonal conflict from non-personal disagreement, making it easier for individuals to disagree in constructive ways (Shah and Jhen, 1993) . Moreover, familiarity can lead to friendship, and as relationships shift towards friendship, levels of task-oriented communication and coordination improve (Jhen and Shah, 1997) . Collectively, these findings suggest that when IR officers gain experience through repeated interactions with investors, they can reduce uncertainties and misperceptions about the firm by improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the communications, and thus improve information assimilation.
Contrasting perspective on the role of IR in facilitating assimilation
One might argue that IR can only play a trivial role in reducing uncertainty about the firm, as firms are already required to publicly disclose all relevant material information. However, corporate disclosures are often insufficient, as it is very difficult for firms to convey information in a comprehensive manner that addresses all market participant needs without overloading them with disclosure. Moreover, there is typically large variation across investors' information demands. As such, there is significant demand from market participants for private discussions with the firm, and this information appears to be very useful. In fact, in a survey of 365 analysts, Brown et al. (2015) find that private communication with the firm "is a more important input to analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than even management earnings guidance, earnings conference calls, and the recent 10-K or 10-Q report."
Despite their idiosyncratic nature and value to investors, these discussions do not run afoul of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) rules. Interpretative guidelines published by the SEC regarding Reg FD allow for private communications related to clarification and interpretation:
"[A]n issuer ordinarily would not be conveying material nonpublic information if it corrected historical facts that were a matter of public record. An issuer also would not be conveying such information if it shared seemingly inconsequential data which, pieced together with public information by a skilled analyst with knowledge of the issuer and the industry, helps form a mosaic that reveals material nonpublic information. It would not violate Regulation FD to reveal this type of data even if, when added to the analyst's own fund of knowledge, it is used to construct his or her ultimate judgments about the issuer." 9
In additional guidance, the SEC notes its broader perspective on private communications with the firm and information assimilation, particularly with respect to analysts:
n issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of information to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a "mosaic" of information that, taken together, is material. Similarly, since materiality is an objective test keyed to the reasonable investor, Regulation FD will not be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial information whose significance is discerned by the analyst. Analysts can provide a valuable service in sifting through and extracting information that would not be significant to the ordinary investor to reach material conclusions. We do not intend, by Regulation FD, to discourage this sort of activity. The focus of Regulation FD is on whether the issuer discloses material nonpublic information, not on whether an analyst, through some combination of persistence, knowledge, and insight, regards as material information whose significance is not apparent to the reasonable investor." 10 Accordingly, we contend that IR communications can have a significant impact on information assimilation, even when they are entirely consistent with Reg FD.
It is also important to highlight that IR spends a significant amount of time engaging with market participants. According to a 2004 study conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute, IR departments spend 83% of their time, on average, interacting with analysts and 9 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regfd-interp.htm 10 https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm institutional investors. Moreover, the 2012 BNY Mellon Global Trends in IR survey indicates that IR officers typically undertake an average of 145 one-on-one meetings with investors and analysts each year. This does not include one-on-one meetings conducted between other managers and investors, in which the IR officer is also likely to participate (Mellon 2012) . Combined with the large volume of phone discussions, in-person investor events, company site visits, non-deal road shows, etc, it is clear that IR can play a significant role in helping the market assimilate firm information. While the CEOs and CFOs can also help with the assimilation process, they generally have neither the time to adequately address idiosyncratic information demands nor the same degree of specialized training and frequent practice in judging which private communications are permissible, and may therefore hesitate to engage in private communication. 11
Sample
To conduct our analyses, we start by collecting all available earnings conference call transcripts from the Reg FD newswire service available through Factiva for the years 2002 (the earliest year conference call transcripts are available) through 2013 (the last full year for which transcripts were available at the time we collected data for this study). We then identify firms with IR officers and infer the tenure of the IR officer from the names and titles of participants on the earnings conference call transcripts. We identify IR officers as managers whose titles do not include words indicative of either the CEO or CFO but do include at least one of these words: "IR", "investor relations", or "investor". Because some IR officers are also responsible for public relations activities, we also include managers whose titles include the words "public relations," "external relations," or "strategic" when no IR officers are identified using the previous list. We categorize firms with no IR officer participating on the conference call transcript as non-IR firms. 12 We infer IR officer tenure by observing when each IR officer was first listed as a participant on a conference call. To improve the accuracy and relevance of our tenure measure, we exclude (i) firms with fewer than 15 observations spread across the entire unadjusted sample, as it is less clear how long the IR officers of these firms have been serving in their positions, and (ii) observations where IR officer tenure is less than one year (as the benefits of IR officers are not immediate because time is required to establish a credible relationship with investors). We match our adjusted sample of IR officer firm-quarters from the Reg FD newswire to Compustat by firm name and the proximity of the conference call date from the Reg FD newswire to the earnings announcement date recorded in Compustat. 
Research design and empirical results
The primary function of IR professionals is to interact with investors and analysts on an ongoing basis to address their information needs as well as mitigate any misinformation they may have, thereby helping them better understand the firm and its prospects on a timely basis.
That is, IR officers help reduce the market's uncertainty about the firm. In this section, we discuss our empirical approach to examine the relation between IR programs and uncertainty. More specifically, for our main analyses, we examine the relation between the presence of IR and stock price volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, and analyst forecast accuracy. We then conduct several additional analyses to support our inferences drawn from our main analyses. Table 2 provides summary statistics and definitions of the dependent variables, variables of interest, and control variables used in our analyses.
Throughout our main analyses, we estimate our regressions using two approaches. First, we use firm fixed effects to account for any unobservable time-invariant factors related to the firm, which can bias our inferences. Second, we employ an entropy balancing technique, which is a quasi-matching approach that weights each observation such that post-weighting distributional properties of treatment and control observations are virtually identical, thereby ensuring covariate balance (Hainmueller, 2012; McMullin and Schonberger, 2015) . 13 To see the intuition behind entropy balancing, consider it in the context of the traditional propensity score matching (PSM) approach. Under PSM, observations are essentially assigned a weight of 0 or 1; that is, they are either included or excluded from the matched sample based on the outcome of the first-stage model. In comparison, entropy balancing weights observations on a continuous scale, thereby preserving the entire sample and ensuring covariate balance by identifying the precise weights of control observations that allow for an optimal weighted match with treatment observations.
Our use of entropy balancing rather than the commonly used PSM approach is motivated by two primary considerations. First, when we employ the PSM approach, we fail to achieve covariate balance due to differences between treatment and control observations along several determinants of IR, which raises concerns about our ability to use PSM for causal inferences (Drake, 1993) . Second, using the PSM approach reduces our sample size by 65% to 75% in our main analyses because of the imbalance between IR and non-IR observations in our un-matched sample. (See Table 3 for distributional properties of the matching variables for the original sample, the sample after propensity score matching and the sample after entropy balancing.) 13 In particular, the entropy balancing method works by first determining the distributional properties (mean and variance) of the treatment observations. These distributional properties become the target distributional properties of the post-weighting control sample (also known as the "balance conditions"). The algorithm proceeds by first assigning possible weights to control observations and then testing whether the balance conditions have been met (i.e., distributional properties of treatment and post-weighted control observations are identical). The algorithm repeats this process over multiple iterations until a set of weights for control observations are found such that the balance conditions are met. Treatment observations are not re-weighted, meaning they retain their default weighting of one while control observations are assigned a positive weight that may be greater or less than one. After the algorithm finishes assigning weights to each observation, these weights are used in subsequent regression analyses.
The entropy balancing technique preserves our full sample and ensures covariate balance between treatment (IR) and control (non-IR) observations by re-weighting observations such that the post-weighting mean and variance for IR and non-IR observations are virtually identical along the following dimensions: firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, scaled earnings and earnings volatility. These factors have been shown to be related to the decision to hire an IR team (Kirk and Vincent 2014; Bushee and Miller 2012) . In addition to these benefits, entropy balancing also has higher model efficiency and less first-stage model dependency than PSM (Hainmueller, 2012) . Accordingly, we report our results using entropy balancing. 
Main Analyses
IR and stock return volatility
Our first main analysis examines the relation between IR and investor uncertainty. We posit that if IR professionals help reduce investors' uncertainty about the firm by helping them better assimilate information, we should observe reduced stock return volatility. Our intuition draws from prior theoretical and empirical work (Barry 1978; Brown 1979; Dye 1985; Pastor and Veronesi 2003; Billings, Jennings and Lev 2015) . The idea is that investors are uncertain about the parameters of the distribution of firms' future cash flows and earnings. However, they learn about these parameters over time as they receive information about the firm. Given investors' uncertainty is positively correlated with stock return volatility (Barry 1978; Brown 1979; Billings et al. 2015) , to the extent IR professionals can lower uncertainty through interactions with investors, there should be a decrease in return volatility.
To test the effects of IR programs on stock return volatility, we estimate the following OLS regression across the primary sample of IR and non-IR firm-quarters, as indicated:
where ReturnVolatility is the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns during the quarter multiplied by 100; IRFirm is an indicator variable set equal to one for firm-quarters in which we observe an IR officer. Controls is a vector of control variables intended to absorb variation in stock return volatility attributable to firm characteristics, capital market conditions and/or characteristics of the firm's information environment likely to be associated with stock return volatility over the quarter. In particular, LnAtq controls for firm size. Growth controls for the change in sales. ScaledEarnings and UnexpectedEarnings control for firm profitability and performance relative to expectations. We control for M&A activity, as it may increase differences of opinion among investors about the future prospects of the firm. We control for variability in earnings (EarningsVolatility) because investor uncertainty is likely to be higher for firms with more variable earnings. Prior12MonthReturn controls for the effect of stock price momentum on investor uncertainty. Leverage controls for the financial risk of the firm. MB controls for the growth prospects of the firm. Forecasts and NumPressReleases are used to proxy for disclosure, as management forecasts and other press releases convey important information about firm value (Healy and Palepu 2001) . MediaMentions captures the amount of media coverage the firm receives.
NumAnalysts and InstOwnership capture the degree of external monitoring and analysis. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the footnotes to Table 2 .
To the extent IR programs help investors assimilate information, we expect that IR firms will have lower stock price volatility relative to non-IR firms. Thus, we predict a negative coefficient estimate on IRFirm (β1<0) in Equation (1). Column 1 (2) of Table 4 reports the results from estimating Equation 1 using firm fixed effects (entropy balancing), excluding observations where IR tenure is less than one year. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient estimate for β1 is negative and significant at the 1% level across both estimation methods. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 , we repeat our estimation of Equation (1) excluding observations where IR tenure is less than three years based on the intuition that longer-tenured IR officers are likely to be more effective at helping investors assimilate information. The results are similar to those in Columns 1 and 2; however, the coefficient estimate for β1 is slightly more negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. As shown at the bottom of Table 4 , a test of differences in the IRFirm coefficients across the two groups suggests that longer tenured IR officers have a larger impact on stock volatility. The economic magnitude of these results implies that firms employing an IR officer who has a minimum tenure of at least one (three) year(s) have 2.3% (3.8%) lower stock price volatility relative to firms without an IR officer. Collectively, the findings in Table 4 provide evidence consistent with our prediction that IR firms have lower stock price volatility than do non-IR firms, as IR officers reduce uncertainty about the firm by helping investors assimilate information. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for firms with longer tenured IR officers.
IR and analyst forecast properties
We next examine the impact of IR on analyst uncertainty, where we focus our analyses on analysts' forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy. By engaging in regular, ongoing dialogue with analysts, IR professionals can help analysts reduce their uncertainties regarding the firm. By addressing the idiosyncratic needs across analysts, IR professionals effectively coordinate the collective belief across analysts, thereby decreasing analyst forecast dispersion. In turn, this more robust understanding of the firm and its prospects should result in analysts providing more accurate forecasts about a firm's future performance.
In order to test the effects of IR on analyst forecast dispersion and accuracy, we estimate the following regression across the primary sample of IR and non-IR firm-quarters, as indicated:
where ForecastDispersion is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts made before the earnings announcement date, and ForecastAccuracy is the negative absolute value of the mean analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price for the latest quarterly EPS forecast made by each analyst before the earnings announcement date. Controls is defined as before.
Given the frequency with which IR officers interact with analysts to help them assimilate information by addressing their idiosyncratic information needs, we expect to observe less disperse and more accurate analyst forecasts for IR firms relative to non-IR firms. As such, we predict a negative coefficient estimate on IRFirm (β1<0) when ForecastDispersion is the dependent variable and a positive coefficient estimate on IRFirm (β1>0) when ForecastAccuracy is the dependent variable in Equation (2).
Panel A (B) of Table 5 reports the results from estimating Equation (2) Tables 4 and 5 suggest that IR officers help the market assimilate information, resulting in improved market outcomes.
Additional Analyses
In our main analyses, we examine the impact of IR officers on investors' assimilation of firm news (as captured by reduced stock return volatility) and analysts' assimilation of firm news (as captured by decreased forecast dispersion and increased forecast accuracy). In these tests, we attempt to mitigate coefficient bias along several dimensions. Namely, we include year and firm fixed effects to difference out unobserved time-specific and/or firm-specific characteristics affecting market outcomes. We also use an entropy balancing method to address omitted variable bias. Further, we control for several firm-level characteristics, capital market conditions and characteristics of the firm's information environment that could impact market outcomes.
Notwithstanding these factors, we conduct several additional tests to support our inferences and improve our internal validity. In particular, we examine two event-specific settings in which the market faces increased uncertainty and IR can play a significant role in facilitating assimilation: (i) earnings announcements, and (ii) major accounting restatements by other firms in the same industry. We also examine the loss of a long-tenured IR officer, which should hinder assimilation because long-tenured IR officers have established relationships with investors and analysts that allow for more effective communications.
IR and the price discovery process
Earnings announcements are very important information events. Soltes (2014) documents that demand for private communications with managers peaks following earnings announcements as investors and analysts attempt to understand and interpret earnings news. Given the high degree of information processing and interpretation occurring around this time, we expect the effects of information assimilation will be particularly impactful.
To capture the role of IR in this setting, we examine price discovery, which is the process by which information is impounded into a firm's public stock price. In particular, we estimate the speed of price discovery using an intraperiod timeliness (IPT) metric following prior research (Twedt 2016; Bushman, Smith, and Wittenberg-Moerman 2010; Butler, Kraft, and Weiss 2007; McNichols 1984) . This metric captures the timeliness with which information is impounded into prices from the earnings announcement date through the tenth day after the earnings announcement (day 0 to day +10). 15 To calculate IPT, we first construct a curve that plots (for each day in the window) the proportion of the event window's abnormal return realized up to and including that particular day. For day m, this value is the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return from day 0 through day m, scaled by the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return for the entire period. The resulting IPT measure estimates the area under the curve for each firm-quarter as a measure of price discovery, where greater values (areas) signal more timely price discovery. This process for creating the IPT measure is summarized in the formula below:
IPT0, 10 = ½ Σ 10 m=0 (BHm-1 + BHm)/BH10 = Σ 9 m=0 (BHm)/BH10 )+ 0.5
Using this IPT measure, we then estimate the following regression across the primary sample of IR and non-IR firm-quarters, as indicated:
where IPT is described above, and Controls is defined as before for our main analyses. If firms with IR officers are able to help market participants assimilate firm information more efficiently and effectively, we should observe more timely price discovery-i.e., a greater IPT value.
Accordingly, we predict a positive coefficient estimate on IRFirm (β1>0).
Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) of Table 6 report the results of estimating Equation (4). The coefficient estimate for β1 is positive and statistically significant across all columns of Table 6 . The economic magnitude of these results implies that firms employing an IR officer who has a minimum tenure of at least one (three) year(s) have a 2.8% (3.1%) quicker price discovery process.
These results support our main inferences that IR officers help capital market participants assimilate information, resulting in a timelier price discovery process.
IR and peer firm accounting restatements
We next examine the effect of IR when there is a major accounting restatement by a peer firm in the same industry. In this setting, we expect that the information assimilation role of IR will be particularly beneficial because a significant accounting restatement by a peer firm serves as an exogenous shock that is likely to increase uncertainty among investors about other firms in the same industry. As shown in Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008) , when a firm has a restatement, there is not only a significant price drop for that firm, but there is a contagion effect whereby peer firms within that same industry also experience a decline in their stock price, as there are concerns about the content and credibility of their information. These events are likely to trigger considerable discussion with the firm to reduce investors' uncertainties. Accordingly, we expect the contagion effect to be less severe for IR firms. In order to test this prediction, we estimate the following regression across the sub-sample of IR and non-IR firm-quarters in industries in which a major accounting statement is announced:
where Cumret [2, 30] is the cumulative abnormal return measured over days +2 to +30 after the filing date of an 8K marked as item 4.02 of a firm within the same industry for which the cumulative abnormal return to the restatement firm was negative 1% or lower, which are the restatements most likely to lead to industry contagion (Gleason et al. 2008) . Equation (5) This analysis provides support for our main inferences using an exogenous shock to the information environment to capture the effect of IR on assimilation.
Transition from long-tenured to new IR officer
As a final test of the impact of IR on information assimilation, we examine whether the capital market outcomes we examined in our previous analyses (return volatility, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion and price discovery) deteriorate when a firm loses a long-tenured IR officer.
As discussed earlier, as IR officers gain experience, they develop a more robust understanding of the firm and establish trust and credibility with investors and analysts, which improves the effectiveness and efficiency of their communications, resulting in improved information assimilation. Thus, when experienced IR officers leave the firm, assimilation should deteriorate.
An important benefit of this analysis is that it helps rule out competing explanations related to contemporaneous effects of traditional disclosure. That is, it is possible that IR firms simply have higher quality disclosures. Although we proxy for the firm's disclosure policy using earnings guidance and the number of firm-initiated press releases in our main analyses (i.e.,
Forecasts and NumPressReleases), these controls may not capture nuanced differences in disclosure quality. The advantage of this setting is that disclosures are likely to remain largely unchanged around a change in the IR officer.
Our intuition for examining IR turnover rather than the initial hiring of an IR officer is that the hiring of an IR officer might correspond with a broader initiative by the firm to increase transparency, thereby making it difficult to disentangle which of the two effects caused the improved information environment. In contrast, it is highly unlikely that the turnover of an IR officer would be correlated with a firm-initiated reduction in disclosure unrelated to the IR officer. Thus, if we observe deterioration in the information environment when an experienced IR officer leaves the firm, we argue that the IR officer must have played a positive role in the assimilation process over and above the firm's traditional disclosure policy.
To conduct our test, we eliminate all non-IR firms from the primary sample, which reduces the sample from 144,822 to 28,744 firm-quarter observations. We then further restrict the sample to 568 instances in which a long-tenured IR officer (with a minimum tenure of 3 years) leaves the position and where we observe a new IR officer within two quarters. We collect the 8 firmquarters around the quarter in which the long-tenured IR officer departs the position, which represent 4,544 firm-quarters. As a final restriction, we collapse these observations in average pre and post period values to mitigate the possibility of serial correlation arising from using a noncollapsed sample. These steps result in a final sample of 1,136 observations.
Using this reduced sample, we estimate the following regression: Table 8 are consistent with our predictions. These findings indicate that capital market outcomes deteriorate when firms transition from a long-tenured IR officer to a new IR officer, suggesting there is better information assimilation by IR officers when they have been in their position for a longer time. This supports the view that relationships and expertise matter in information assimilation.
One possible alternative explanation for these results is that there may have been a contemporaneous turnover in top management (CEO), which caused greater uncertainty about the firm's future. To mitigate this concern, we estimate Equation (6) across the sample of observations for which there is CEO information available on ExecuComp, which reduces our sample from 1,136 to 908 observations. After controlling for CEO turnover, our results continue to hold at statistically significant levels for ForecastDispersion, ForecastAccuracy and IPT, but we no longer find a significant result for ReturnVolatility (t-stat=1.15).
Another possible alternative explanation is that other factors at the firm changed simultaneously to the change in IR officer, such as firm disclosure or profitability, which could cause the negative future outcomes we observe. However, in untabulated results, we find no difference between the frequency of forecasts, the level of media coverage or firm earnings when comparing the pre and post periods. Overall, these additional tests support our main inferences.
Impact threshold of the confounding variable
We test the sensitivity of our results to possible correlated omitted variables using the impact threshold for a confounding variable (ITCV) procedure recommended by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and Frank (2000) . This approach calculates the minimum magnitude an omitted variable would need to be (relative to the most impactful included variable) in order to overturn the main result. Table 9 reports the results of this analysis, which we conduct for each of our main findings: stock price volatility, analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion and price formation in columns
(1), (2), (3) and (4), respectively. We find that an omitted (confounding) variable would need to be at least 1.5, 2.9, 3.3 or 22.2 times larger than the most impactful control variable for tests of volatility, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion and price formation, respectively. While these results cannot rule out the possibility that an omitted variable influences our results, they show that such a variable would need to be rather large in magnitude in order to overturn our results.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to study the role of IR programs in improving information assimilation. We show that firms with in-house IR programs have lower stock price volatility, higher analyst forecast accuracy, lower analyst forecast dispersion and quicker price discovery around earnings announcements, and these results are generally stronger for longer-tenured IR officers. We also see a similar effect consistent with better information assimilation for IR firms when there is an accounting restatement for other firms in the industry. Finally, we observe a deterioration in the information environment when firms transition from a long tenured to new IR officer, as IR experience plays a major role in assimilation.
These results contribute to our understanding of how information assimilation influences the information environment and capital market outcomes. It also expands upon previous literature documenting various capital market benefits of IR programs. These results are relevant to managers given the increasing popularity of IR programs and to capital market participants given our evidence that IR programs improve information assimilation, particularly during times of industry uncertainty. Our results also suggest that IR programs provide a potential remedy to problems arising from limited investor attention and information overload. Tables 3, 5 Subsample for which ForecastAccuracy can be calculated 95,476 Table 5 Subsample for which ForecastDispersion can be calculated 71,703 Table 5 Primary sample excluding obs with IR tenure < 3 years 132,748 Tables 3, 5 Subsample for which ForecastAccuracy can be calculated 83,853 Table 5 Subsample for which ForecastDispersion can be calculated 61,138 Table 5 Firm/quarters in the same SIC 4-digit industry as the firm announcing a major restatement 50,253 Table 7 Subsample excluding obs with IR tenure < 3 years 43,952 Table 7 Firms transitioning from long to short-tenured IR officer 1,136 Table 8 This panel describes how the primary sample was constructed and the composition of sub-samples used in each This panel describes the number of observations in the primary sample by fiscal year. 72% 74% 78% 81% 77% 78% 78% 79% 81% 81% 79%
Panel D: Percentage of Conference Calls with IROs by year and firm size
Large-cap ($5 billion -$25 billion) 59% 60% 65% 68% 70% 71% 73% 75% 75% 75% 74%
Mid-cap ($1 billion -$4.9 billion) 44% 48% 51% 51% 53% 57% 62% 59% 58% 61% 59% This table provides summary statistics. ReturnVolatility is the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns during the quarter multiplied by 100. IRFirm is an indicator variable set equal to one for firm/quarters in which we observe an IR officer. Lnatq is the log of total assets measured at the end of the quarter. Growth is the decile ranking of change in revenue from the same quarter in the previous year. ScaledEarnings is earnings before unusual items scaled by the market value of equity for the firm at the end of the quarter. UnexpectedEarnings is earnings before unusual items less earnings before unusual items in the same quarter of the prior year scaled by the market value of equity for the firm at the end of the quarter. M&A is a dummy variable set equal to one if the firm reported a nonzero amount for acquisitions on its statement of cash flows. EarningsVolatility is the standard deviation of the firm's quarterly earnings scaled by the market value of equity over the prior eight quarters. Prior12MonthReturn is the cumulative abnormal return (benchmarked by the value-weighted market return) over the prior year measured at the end of the quarter. Leverage is assets divided by book equity at the end of the quarter. MB is the market value of equity divided by book equity at the end of the quarter. Forecasts is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm provided an earnings forecast during the quarter. MediaMentions is the number of unique news stories published by the firm during the quarter as captured by the Ravenpack database.
NumPressReleases is the log of one plus the number of firm-initiated press releases as captured by the Ravenpack database. NumAnalysts is the log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm.
InstOwnership is the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. ForecastAccuracy is the negative absolute value of the mean analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price for the latest quarterly EPS forecast made by each analyst before the earnings announcement date. ForecastDispersion is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts made before the earnings announcement date. IPT [0, 10] is the decile-ranked 11-day intraperiod timeliness measure of the speed with which information disclosed in earnings announcements is impounded into stock prices. 28,199 116,623 This table presents distributional properties (mean and variance) for the IR and non-IR observations across the original sample (Panel A), the propensity score matched sample (Panel B) and the entropy balanced sample (Panel C). Differences between the sample means and variances are presented in the columns labeled "Diff". *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Significance levels are calculated using a t-test for the difference in means and an F-test for the difference in variances. This table models the effect of IR on stock price volatility as described in Equation (1). Observations in which IR tenure is less than one (three) year(s) are excluded from Columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4). The dependent variable, ReturnVolatility, is the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns during the quarter multiplied by 100. The variable of interest, IRFirm, is an indicator variable set equal to one for firm/quarters in which we observe an IR officer. Columns 1 & 3 are estimated using firm and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered by firm. Columns 2 & 4 are estimated using entropy balancing with year and industry fixed effects. The control variables are defined in Table 2 . Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (one-tailed for predicted coefficients and two-tailed for non-predicted coefficients). Table 2 . Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (one-tailed for predicted coefficients and two-tailed for non-predicted coefficients). This panel models the effect of IR on analyst forecast accuracy as described in Equation (2). Observations in which IR tenure is less than one (three) year(s) are excluded from Columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4). The dependent variable, ForecastAccuracy is calculated as the negative absolute value of the mean analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price for the latest quarterly EPS forecast made by each analyst before the earnings announcement date. The variable of interest, IRFirm, is an indicator variable set equal to one for firm/quarters in which we observe an IR officer. Columns 1 & 3 are estimated using firm and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered by firm. Columns 2 & 4 are estimated using entropy balancing with year and industry fixed effects. The control variables are defined in Table 2 . Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (one-tailed for predicted coefficients and two-tailed for non-predicted coefficients). This table models the effect of IR on IPT around earnings announcements as described in Equation (4). Observations in which IR tenure is less than one (three) year(s) are excluded from Columns 1 & 2 (3 & 4). The dependent variable, IPT [0, 10] , is the decile-ranked 11-day intraperiod timeliness measure of the speed with which information disclosed in earnings announcements is impounded into stock prices. Columns 1 & 3 are estimated using firm and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered by firm. Columns 2 & 4 are estimated using entropy balancing with year and industry fixed effects. The control variables are defined in Table 2 . Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (onetailed for predicted coefficients and two-tailed for non-predicted coefficients). [2, 5] , [2,15] and [2, 30] are the cumulative abnormal returns over days -1 to 1, 2 to 5, 2 to 15 and 2 to 30, respectively relative to the date that the major accounting restatement was announced by another firm in the same 4-digit SIC industry. Columns 1 & 3 of Panel B are estimated using firm and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered by firm. Columns 2 & 4 of Panel B are estimated using entropy balancing with year and industry fixed effects. The control variables are Lnatq, Growth, ScaledEarnings, UnexpectedEarnings, M&A, EarningsVolatility, Prior12MonthReturn, Leverage, MB, Forecasts, MediaMentions, NumPressReleases, NumAnalysts, Inst. Ownership, which are defined in Table 2 . Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (one-tailed for predicted coefficients and two-tailed for nonpredicted coefficients). This table models the effect of losing a long-tenured IR officer on stock return volatility, properties of analyst forecasts and price formation as described in Equation (6). ReturnVolatility, ForecastAccuracy. ForecastDispersion, and IPT[0, 10] are the dependent variables in Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) Table 2 . Equation (6) is estimated with firm and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (one-tailed for predicted coefficients and two-tailed for non-predicted coefficients). Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and Frank (2000) . Each column represents the impact on the IRFirm of each additional independent variable, which is calculated as the partial correlation with that variable and the dependent variable times the partial correlation of that variable with independent variable of interest, IRFrim. These partial correlations are not presented for parsimony. The row labeled "Largest impact" simply identifies the most impactful control variable included in the model. The row labeled "Impact threshold of the confounding variable" is calculated following Frank (2000) . The last row describes the minimum magnitude of the confounding variable relative to largest impact included variable required to overturn IRFirm, which is calculated as the impact threshold of the confounding variable divided by the largest impact included variable. For example, Column (4) suggests that a confounding (omitted) variable would have to be 22.2 times larger than the most impactful included variable (NumAnalysts) to overturn the observed relationship between IRFirm and IPT [0, 10] .
Panel B: Forecast Accuracy
